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1 Introduction
This paper provides an explanation of two apparent puzzles: why contemporary
firms invest money to increase the quality of relationships among workers, inside
and outside the workplace,1 and why pay for performance (team compensation)
schemes are relatively less (more) widespread than expected (Baker et al. 1998,
2002).
We introduce some changes in the way firms are conceived, and we argue that (1)
corporate activity crucially depends on the realization of complex tasks; (2) these
tasks possess the intrinsic characteristics of trust games with super-additivity and
require the combination of nonoverlapping skills of different workers; (3) workers
have relational preferences (i.e., a taste for the quality of relationships) with
colleagues. By introducing these elements, we show that lower quality of relational
goods, individual pay for performance schemes and (single winner) tournament
incentive structures significantly widen the parametric space of ‘‘non-cooperative’’2
equilibria which, in turn, reduce the sharing of knowledge and the interaction of
different competencies, yielding suboptimal output for the firm. In this paper, we
refer to the concept of relational goods (Ash 2000), slightly different from that of
reciprocity (Fehr and Falk 2002), as a crucial missing element required to shed light
on the interaction between incentive rules and productivity. According to Uhlaner
(1989) and Gui (2000), relational goods are local public goods that need (1) to be
jointly coproduced and (2) to be simultaneously co-consumed to be enjoyed. While
a sufficient condition for reciprocity is the feeling of the obligation to reciprocate a
positive or negative action from the counterpart, relational values are more related
to the pleasure that individuals have in spending time with the others.3 Frey (1997)
argues that more personal relationships imply recognition, trust and loyalty which,
in turn, support intrinsic motivation. Relational goods are, therefore, at the root of
the widely analyzed phenomena of trust, reciprocity and intrinsic motivation (Fehr
et al. 1997; Fehr and Ga¨chter 2000; Bewley 1995). Despite the controversial issues
on the nature of relational goods, there is a general consensus that such goods
cannot be defined using the standard properties of rivalry and excludability. Randon
et al. (2008) suggest three new characteristics: simultaneity, motivation and identity
(Gui 2002; Sugden 2005 and Uhlaner 1989) commonly agree with them. In our
1 To quote just some of the innumerable examples of corporate ‘‘teambuilding’’ practices, one of the
biggest Italian banks, Mediobanca, finances weekend skying holidays, and the Italian telecom company
sailing holidays, to its management and white collars with the goal of increasing their group working
attitudes.
2 Note that we define as cooperative solution the equilibrium given by the (share, not abuse) pair of
strategies (see Fig. 1) and as noncooperative solutions the (do not share, abuse) and (share, abuse)
equilibria which do not imply the joint work of the two players. Hence, the term cooperative is not
referred to the structure of the game (or to the coordination/noncoordination of players decisions) but to
the characteristics of its equilibrium.
3 Bruni and Stanca (2008) document how relational goods impact positively on life satisfaction. Frey
et al. (2007) provide theoretical explanations for the underinvestment in relationship. Other theoretical
models highlighting important elements of the relational good approach such as the conditionality of the
enjoyment of leisure invested in relational goods to the investment choice of partners are those of Corneo
(2005), Jenkins and Osberg (2003), Antoci et al. (2007) and Bruni et al. (2008).
4 L. Becchetti et al.
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model, the relational goods enjoyed by two workmates before the game experience
is a stock that depends on the ‘‘set of intangibles ranging from companionship,
sympathy and intimacy’’ based on past experiences. Successful cooperation adds to
the existing stock, while the decision to abuse destroys such stock. This is how
relationships work in the reality. Given these characteristics, more standard
concepts such as those of reciprocity4 and guilt aversion5 would be inadequate for
our model. If the positive effect generated from cooperation that we model in the
game may arise from coherence with an internalized norm of reciprocity (and
therefore, reciprocity and relational goods may produce observationally equivalent
predictions in the case of the share, not abuse equilibrium), reciprocity fails to grasp
that the cost of abusing implies the loss of the ex ante level of friendship with the
workmate. With reciprocity, the cost of abusing would be the same whatever the
counterpart. A similar reasoning applies for guilt aversion. In both cases, a disutility
is attached to the subject not corresponding with a cooperative behavior to a
cooperative behavior of the counterpart, but the disutility is impersonal, that is, it is
related to a disposition of the subject and not depending on the (story of the)
relationship between the individual and the counterpart. On the contrary, with
relational goods, the cost depends on the ex ante stock of relational goods, that is, on
the story of the relationship. This example brings into light that the concept of
relational goods is able to capture the specificity of the relationship, that is, the
history of the intercourse between two individuals and to deal with it objectively.
With reciprocity, the others are all equal, and my kindness in response to an act of
kindness is just an act of coherence with my own internal norms. With relational
goods, we acknowledge the ‘‘otherness’’ of our counterpart and of the relationship
created with her. This implies that the cost of abusing is not always the same but
varies in proportion to the quality and history of my relationship with the
counterpart. Note as well that in the concept of relational goods we develop there is
a symmetry in its value for both counterparts. For simplicity, we assume in the
model that all individuals have the same metric on the stock of relational goods, and
therefore, its value gives the same utility to both. Hence, a noncooperative behavior
does not produce only a loss for the noncooperating individual but also for her
counterpart. This is not the case if we use the concept or reciprocity or guilt aversion
since, in this case, the loss arises only for the noncorresponding individual. Given
what considered above, relational goods have, therefore, with respect to guilt
aversion and reciprocity, two important properties that make such concept more
consistent with what happens in real-life relationships.
4 Following Greig and Bohnet (2008, p. 2) ‘‘Reciprocity is an internalized norm, inducing people to
respond to kindness with kindness and to unkindness with unkindness, even if it is not in a person’s
material self-interest to do so. It differs fundamentally from cooperation in repeated games where
reputational concerns can enforce ‘cooperation’’’ (e.g., Kreps et al. 1982; Fudenberg and Maskin 1986).
5 An individual is guilt averse when she suffers a disutility from guilt where, according to Baumeister
et al. (1994), guilt is intended as …‘‘an unpleasant emotional state … that is caused by the infliction of
harm, loss, or distress on a relationship partner (p. 245)’’. Corazzini et al. (2007, p. 2) add that ‘‘If subjects
feel guilty because of (believing that they are) letting others down, they shoulder psychological costs of
lying. These costs increase with the perceived harm of deceiving others (see Baumeister et al. 1994 and
Dufwenberg 2002)’’.
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We identify a positive nexus that goes from the quality of workers’ relationships
to the willingness to share information and cooperate and, from the latter, to firm
productivity.
The paper applies the standard trust game approach to the literature of the firm’s
organization, and to our knowledge, it represents the first study on the consequences
of trust games among coworkers. The specific characteristics which make our trust
game different from the standard one are that (1) the payoff is not continuous and
depends on the relative performance of the two players; (2) a clear rationale for the
increase in the payoff in the case of cooperation is provided; (3) the trustee can not
arbitrarily decide how much output he has to give back to the trustor, and (4) in the
extension of the model with pay for performance schemes, the trustee decision of
not abusing implies an additional specific penalty (loss of part of his pay for
performance fee).
The decision to model the firm activity as a corporate trust game is due to the fact
that, departing from the assembly line perspective and moving toward a modern
firm in which workers skills are central to create value and innovate products and
processes, corporate activity becomes more complex and requires the sharing and
interaction of different nonoverlapping competencies and information. Regarding
this point, Thompson and Wallace (1996) argue that, with the development of lean
production and other forms of work organization under advanced manufacturing,
team-working has emerged as a central focus of redesigning production. Katz and
Rosemberg (2004) argue that ‘‘the productivity of an organization crucially depends
on cooperation among workers’’ and highlight the importance of altruistic and
cooperative attributes in workers emphasized by the organizational theory (see
among others, Smith et al. 1983; Organ 1988; Organ and Ryan 1995; McNeely and
Meglino 1994; Penner et al. 1997 and Podsakoff and Mackenzie 1993). With our
novel approach, we also aim to reconcile theoretical models with the empirical
evidence on the lower than expected diffusion of individual pay for performance
schemes and the higher than expected spread of profit sharing or team compensation
schemes, especially among workers who perform some kind of intellectual activities
(Frey 1997; Baker et al. 1998, 2002). This evidence seems to be consistent with the
standard theory of the firm and with the traditional argument advanced in
the literature on tournament schemes and their positive effects on performance when
the disciplining effect is larger than the crowding-out effect of intrinsic motivation
(Lazear and Rosen 1981). To explain this paradox, Fehr and Falk (2002) argue that
peer pressure on high performers may reduce the positive impact of tournaments on
corporate productivity.6 Other potential explanations for the puzzle are horizontal
equity concerns and imperfect performance measurement. As pointed out by
Kosfeld and von Siemens (2007), firms often develop remarkably different
corporate cultures characterized by differences in the level of cooperation and
team work. In the airline industry, for example, Southwest Airlines has become the
prototype of a strong cooperative corporate culture since team spirit and good
6 The crowding-out hypothesis relies on the assumption that if workers are already intrinsically
motivated, an extrinsic reward over motivates them leading the latter to react by reducing the motivation
which is under their control (i.e., the intrinsic motivation).
6 L. Becchetti et al.
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relationship between different work units play a key role (Gittell 2000, 2003). In
contrast to Southwest, most of the other US airlines have been unable to achieve
cooperation between workers and have been often characterized by a culture of
conflict rather than cooperation (Gittell et al. 2004). Ichniowsky et al. (1997) report
similar differences for the steel industry, documenting a strong heterogeneity in
human resource management practices (including team work, training, hiring,
supervision, etc.) in a sample of 36 US production lines all of which operate in the
same steel finishing business. Other empirical contributions show that firms that
enjoy high level of team work tend to be more productive than firms without or with
low levels of team work. Ichniowsky, Shaw and Prennushi (1997) find that
production lines using innovative work practices, which include high levels of team
work, are significantly more productive than lines with the traditional approach
where team work does not play an important role. Hamilton et al. (2003) analyze the
effect of a ‘‘cultural change’’ from individual to team production in a US garment
plan and find a positive impact of team work on productivity. Finally, high levels of
cooperation seem to be associated with weak individual incentives or viceversa.
Encinosa et al. (2007), for example, show in a US random sample of medical group
practices that incentive pay reduces aid activities among physicians such as mutual
consultations about cases. Moreover, the relationship between cooperative attitudes
and incentive schemes may be affected by selection bias. Burks et al. (2006) show in
a sample of Swiss and US bicycle messenger companies that firms that pay for
performance employ significantly less cooperative workers than those that pay
hourly wages or are organized as cooperatives.
Exploring the links between workers’ relational attitudes, incentive schemes and
performance, our paper provides a broad and simple framework which is consistent
with the previously mentioned findings. The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2
examines the one shot and the infinitely repeated full information games (with and
without the presence of relational goods) when the two players own the company.
Section 3 illustrates the equilibria for the corporate trust game when players do not
own the company and pay for performance and tournament schemes are introduced.
Section 4 briefly illustrates the optimal personnel policy for ‘‘trust game
corporations’’. Finally, Sect. 5 draws some conclusions.
2 The basic trust game when the players own the company
We assume that the firm activity originates from the performance of complex tasks7
that require the contribution of knowledge, inventive skills and ideas of workers
with nonoverlapping human capital endowments. We assume that each complex
task consists in a trust game between two workers who own the firm, player A and
B. Nature chooses the personal skills (stand alone contributions to final output) of
7 Consider for instance a blueprint in which different skills are production inputs related by some forms
of complementarity, or to the definition of a corporate strategy which requires participants from different
firm divisions to share knowledge and skills. The same scheme could be applied in different fields of
activity such as, for instance, a coauthored academic working paper to which different researchers
contribute with their specialized skills.
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the two players, ha [ R
? and hb [ R
?, respectively, and skill types are immediately
revealed to players. One of the two players (player A, the trustor) may decide
whether sharing or not his skills with the other player. In the second stage of the
game, the second player (player B, the trustee) may decide to cooperate or abuse.
We assume that sharing ideas, projects or intuitions create a positive externality,
introduced in the model as a super-additive component, ðe 2 ½0;1Þ; generated by
the dialogic process of jointly performing the task. Interaction and information
sharing are necessary to improve production knowledge. In particular, we argue that
(1) part of the skills may be acquired only by integrating experiences of different
people; (2) learning is a process that can be enhanced by explaining and comparing
one’s own knowledge with the others.
Summing up the set of available strategies, player A (the trustor) may decide to
share (s strategy) or not share (ns strategy) his initial ideas with the trustee who, in
turn, may decide to abuse (a strategy) or not (na strategy). If the trustee decides to
abuse, he will join his ideas with those of the trustor and present everything as his
own work, while if he decides to share, the two players will interact and produce, as
additional contribution to the output, the super-additive component e. We assume in
this case that the final output is divided in equal parts between the two players.
Under these assumptions, the set of payoffs (respectively, for player A, player B and
firm) are8
fð0 ha\hb; haj jha [ hbÞ; ð0 ha [ hb; hbj jha\hbÞ; Maxðha; hbÞg
if player A does not share;9
f0; ha þ hb; ha þ hbg
if player A does share but player B does abuse;
fðha þ hb þ eÞ=2; ðha þ hb þ eÞ=2; ha þ hb þ eg;
if player A does share and player B does not abuse.
The game is represented in extensive form in Fig. 1 in the ‘‘Appendix’’.
The analysis of the uniperiodal trust game leads us to formulate the following
proposition.
Proposition 1 The non sharing solution yielding a ‘‘third best’’ suboptimal firm
output is the SPNE of the uniperiodal full information game when (1) the trustor has
noninferior stand alone contribution to output with respect to the trustee’s one and
(2) the super-additive component is inferior to the sum of trustee and trustor stand
alone contributions.
8 The implicit assumption here is that an authority external to the two players will pick up the best
individual ‘‘blueprint’’ (in the case of equal value, any individual project will have a 50% chance of
winning).
9 The implicit assumption here is that the two players’ competencies and skills do not overlap. If they do,
the total output of player B in the (s, a) solution and the one shared by the two players in the (s, na)
solution should be interpreted as the nonoverlapping part of the sum of the two stand alone contributions.
A second assumption implied by our complete information framework is that the trustee has sufficient
skills to be able to understand the contribution provided by the trustor and to abuse of it.
8 L. Becchetti et al.
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Proof When ha [ hb, player A payoff is ha if he does not share and 0 if he decides
to share but player B abuses, as he will do when ha ? hb [ (ha ? hb ? e)/2, or,
e \ ha ? hb (abuse condition). Hence, if ha [ hb
10 and e \ ha ? hb, the nonsharing
solution is the SPNE of the uniperiodal full information game. The SPNE yields a
firm output - Max (ha, hb)—which is lower than the one achievable under
cooperation (ha ? hb ? e), and even lower than the ‘‘second best’’ output
obtainable under the share, abuse pair of strategies (ha ? hb).
11 h
Two consequences of the SPNE of the game which are intuitively reasonable
were the following: (1) the trustor’s decision to share crucially depends on the
knowledge of the relative value of his stand alone contribution to output versus that
of the trustee; (2) the likelihood of the occurrence of the (share, not abuse) solution
is higher when the two players’ stand alone contributions are small with respect to
the output they can generate by applying together to the problem (i.e., the task has
complex rules that can be interpreted only by combining players skills).
Furthermore, the loss of social surplus in the nonsharing solution is
ha ? hb ? e - Max (ha, hb).
12
If we explore the solution of the game when the ranking of stand alone
contributions is inverted, we find that, if ha \ hb and e \ ha ? hb , player A is
indifferent between the two available strategies (share and not share), since the
payoff he will receive is the same in both cases. In such case, we have two sub-game
perfect Nash equilibria represented by the following strategy pairs, (ns, a) or (s, a),
yielding again a suboptimal firm output with a social loss equal to ha ? hb ? e -
Max (ha, hb) or e, respectively. To sum up, the full information uniperiodal game
shows that when the trustor stand alone contribution is higher, and under reasonable
parametric conditions on the super-additive component (lower than the sum of the
stand alone contributions of the two players), the sub-game perfect equilibrium is a
noninformation sharing solution and the firm output is not maximized. Under the
alternative assumption on the relative human capital endowments of the two
players, we have two possible solutions. Both of them do not imply information
sharing and still yield a suboptimal firm output.
2.1 The infinitely repeated game
The analysis of the infinitely repeated version of the game leads us to formulate the
following proposition.
Proposition 2 In the full information infinitely repeated trust game, the (share, not
abuse) strategy is an equilibrium of the game for reasonable discount rates.
10 With ha ¼ hb the trustor will still have a 50% chance of winning and, therefore, a relatively higher
payoff when choosing the nonsharing strategy.
11 We reasonably assume that when player B abuses, he exploits player A information for his own project
before starting the cooperative process of jointly performing the task and, therefore, e = 0.
12 Note that the trustor would, in principle, decide not to share also if e [ ha þ hb; but his payoff from
the information sharing equilibrium is lower than the opportunity cost (the payoff occuring when the
decision is to not share), that is, if e [ ha þ hb. However, as it easy to check, these two conditions cannot
be jointly met.
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Proof If there exists a d [ [0, 1]13 such that the (share, not abuse) equilibrium is
enforceable, the Folk theorem applies. By applying it, we get ð1  ~dÞðha þ hbÞ ¼
ðha þ hb þ eÞ=2 if ha [ hb and ð1  ~dÞðha þ hbÞ þ ~dhb ¼ ðha þ hb þ eÞ=2 if
ha \ hb. If ha [ hb; ~d ¼ 1=2  e=½2ðha þ hbÞ; which is below 1 for reasonable
parametric values. On the other hand, if hb [ ha; ~d ¼ 1=2 þ ð1=2Þ ðhb=haÞ 
ð1=2Þðe=haÞ: Note that in this case, the satisfaction of the [(hb - ha)] [ e condition
implies also discount rates above the admissible range ð~d[ 1Þ. In this case, the no-
abuse condition is not met and the cooperative equilibrium may not be enforced. h
The renegotiation argument applies here. Consider that the punishment strategy
represents a cost for the trustor, equal to (ha ? hb ? e)/2 - ha, if ha [ hb and to
(ha ? hb ? e)/2, if ha \ hb. On the other hand, if player B is punished, he gets 0 if
ha [ hb and hb if ha \ hb. Therefore, after abusing in the first period, both players
may be better off if they shift to cooperative equilibrium. Renegotiation will take
place whenever the continuation payoffs of the (s, na) equilibrium strictly dominate
the continuation payoffs of the (ns, ) equilibrium.14 Hence:
Proposition 3 Even though the (share, not abuse) equilibrium applies, it is based
on a trustor threat which is never renegotiation proof if the superadditivity
component is positive and above the difference in absolute value between trustor’s
and trustee’s stand alone contribution.
Proof The continuation payoffs in the cooperative solution are (ha ? hb ? e)/2
and (ha ? hb ? e)/2, while in the (ns, ) equilibrium are (ha, 0) if ha [ hb and (0, hb)
if hb [ ha; (ha ? hb ? e)/2 [ ha when e [ ha - hb; (ha ? hb ? e)/2 [ hb when
e [ hb - ha. h
Notice that if player A’s stand alone contribution is higher than player B’s,
renegotiation will take place only if player A’s sharing solution is met; for very low
values of e (e \ ha - hb), sharing can never be a solution. When player B’s
contribution is higher, renegotiation will take place if player B’s abuse condition is
met which would prevail when player A does not share, as not sharing would be
player A’s strategy under punishment.15
Note as well that ’’softer ’’ (i.e., tit for tat) punishment strategies, which allow for
instance to meet renegotiation proofness in simultaneous games such as the standard
Prisoners’ Dilemma (Van Damme 1989), cannot apply in our case because (1) the
game is sequential and the punishment of the trustor interrupts the game (hence
making impossible to observe the ’’intention to repent’’ of the punished), and (2)
13 d is the inverse of the subjective discount rate or the standard measure of players’ ‘‘patience’’. Higher
values of d can also be viewed as a measure of the reduced distance between two consecutive stages of
the game.
14 Farrell and Maskin (1989).
15 In the static game, if player B abuses, player A would be indifferent whether sharing or not sharing
because his payoff would always be 0. However, the payoff for B would change following A’s choice: if
A does not share, B can only get hb by abusing, while if A shares, B gets ha þ hb: In the latter case, B
would abuse even with higher values of e (e B ha ? hb).
10 L. Becchetti et al.
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(differently from the Prisoner’s dilemma) punishing is costly for the punisher even
if the punished is willing to revert to cooperation in the same round.
The Folk theorem condition implies that the trustee ‘‘patience’’ required to have a
cooperation equilibrium is negatively related to the super-additive component in
both cases. The intuition is that the super-additive component is what players lose
when they decide not to cooperate; if the loss is high, a cooperative equilibrium can
be enforced also when the trustee has limited patience. Moreover, if ha [ hb; ~d is
higher and positively related to the sum of both players’ stand alone contributions,
while if ha \ hb, the effect of ha on the minimum trustee patience is more
ambiguous as in this case it enters in the trustee’s side payment, thus lessening the
benefits from abusing.
2.2 The one-shot trust game with relational goods when players own
the company
In this section, we take into account the role of relational goods. We assume that the
two players have a stock of accumulated relational goods (F), depending on their
current level of friendship, and may jointly produce a relational good (f) with their
decision to cooperate; the accumulated stock of relational goods between the two
players is enjoyed in every period and may be lost only when one of the two players
decides to abuse and not when he decides not to share. The solution of the uniperiodal
game with relational goods leads us to formulate the following proposition.
Proposition 4 In the uniperiodal full information game, when ðha þ hb  eÞ=
2 [ F and f [ ðha  hb  eÞ=2; there exists a threshold value of the relational
good (f*) in the trustee’s utility function which triggers the switch from the non
cooperative to the cooperative (share, not abuse) equilibrium.
Proof In the presence of relational goods, the payoff set (player A and player B
payoffs and firm output) becomes
fðF ha\hb; F þ haj jha [ hbÞ; ðF ha [ hb; F þ hbj jha\hbÞ; Maxðha; hbÞg
if player A does not share;
f0; ha þ hb; ha þ hbg;
if player A does share but player B does abuse;
fðha þ hb þ eÞ=2 þ F þ f ; ðha þ hb þ eÞ=2 þ F þ f ; ha þ hb þ eg;
if player A does share and player B does not abuse (see Fig. 2 in the ‘‘Appendix’’). In
this case, the abuse condition turns out to be ha ? hb [ e ? 2(F ? f). However, the
trustor would decide not to share even if the abuse condition is not met
(e [ (ha ? hb) - 2(F ? f)) if his payoff from cooperation is inferior to the oppor-
tunity cost, or f ? (ha ? hb ? e)/2 \ ha. Standing these two conditions, there exist a
threshold (f*) in the value of the relational goods for the trustee above which the (share,
not abuse) couple of strategies becomes the SPNE of the single period full information
game, which is equal to f  ¼ Max½ðha þ hb  eÞ=2  F; ðha  hb  eÞ=2: h
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Notice that if the not abuse condition is not met, in the presence of relational
goods the trustor will not be indifferent anymore between sharing or not when
ha \ hb since, by sharing, he will ‘‘induce into temptation’’ the other player with the
risk of losing the accumulated stock of relational goods. Hence, if F [ 0 and
ha \ hb, the (ns, .) strategy is strictly preferred if the not abuse condition is not met.
Under this case, the firm output is always suboptimal but may be lower than that
obtainable in the model without relational goods if in that model the (s, a)
equilibrium is selected. However, if the super-additive component is not high
enough to violate the not abuse condition, the sub-game perfect equilibrium of the
full information uniperiodal game is (ns, a) whatever is the relationship between the
two players stand alone contributions. Again, the noncooperative solution yields a
‘‘third best’’ firm output, Max(ha, hb), which is lower than ha ? hb ? e (firm output
under the (s, na) equilibrium) and lower than the ‘‘second best’’ output obtained
under the (s, a) solution.
Finally, in the presence of relational goods, the not abuse condition may be
respected also for small super-additive components and the payoff from cooperation
for the trustee falls below its opportunity cost, when he has superior stand alone
contribution. In this case, a noncooperative equilibrium is avoided only for high
levels of the flow of relational goods stemming from the decision to cooperate. Also,
the incentive to abuse is reduced because of the potential loss of the stock of
relational goods and the missed production of new relational goods in the case of
noncooperation. The introduction of relational goods, therefore, identifies a virtuous
circle among quality of workers’ relationship, decision to cooperate (which further
increases the quality of relationships) and firm productivity, or among relational
goods, social capital (under the form of trust and trustworthiness) and output.
In the proposition which follows, we show that, by setting reasonable laws of
motion for the stock of relational goods conditional to different outcomes of the
game, the one-shot equilibria described previously are also stationary equilibria16 in
the infinitely repeated version of the corporate trust game with relational goods.
Proposition 5 Given the following three rules of the law of motion of relational
goods:
a. Ft = F0 ? ft|(s, na) SPNE of the game in t;
b. Ft = F0|(ns, a) SPNE of the game in t and
c. Ft = 0|(s, a) SPNE of the game in t,
where F0 is the stock of relational goods at time 0
(s, na) is a stationary equilibrium of the game if: (1a) e [ (ha ? hb)/2 -
(F0 ? ft) and (1b) ft [ (ha - hb - e)/2 when ha [ hb or ha = hb ; (2) if
e [ (ha ? hb)/2 - (F0 ? ft) when ha \ hb. Conversely, if e \ (ha ? hb)/2 -
(F0 ? ft), (ns,a) is a stationary equilibrium of the game.
16 We use the concept of stationary equilibrium as a ‘‘pair of strategies that prescribe to play the stage-
game Nash equilibrium at every stage’’ (Burkov and Chaib-draa 2010) or, equivalently, as ‘‘the
equilibrium of the corresponding one-round game, repeated in every round’’ (Myerson 1991).
12 L. Becchetti et al.
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Proof If the parametric condition (1a) is met for player B, it is better not to abuse
and for player A is better to share under ha \ hb. Under ha [ hb, we need to add also
condition (1b) since this makes more profitable for player A to share than not to
share. If these conditions are met and the (s, na) equilbrium enforced, this raises the
value of F due to the rule (a) of the law of motion of relational goods. Hence, in the
following round, the conditions of the (s, na) equilibrium are reinforced and this
occurs progressively round after round. On the contrary, if parametric condition (2)
is met, player A decides not to share. This does not change the level of F due to rule
(b) and again the equilibrium does not change over game rounds. h
Our results are robust to two small reasonable departures from our hypotheses on
the law of motion of relational goods. First, the situation does not change even if we
modify assumption (b) in the sense that the decision to share alters negatively the
stock of preexisting relational value (we may assume that the decision not to share is
not neutral but ’’offends’’ player B). If F falls, this will reinforce the decision not to
share in the rounds which follow. Second, imagine as well that the consequences of
abuse are not so drastic as those imagined under assumption (c), that is, F falls but
not to zero. Whatever the magnitude of the reduction of F again the incentive to
abuse will be reinforced and player A will persist in her decision not to share.
Setting the following laws of motion for the stock of relational goods conditional
to different outcomes of the game, the one-shot equilibria described earlier are also
stationary equilibria in the infinitely repeated version of the corporate trust game
with relational goods : (1) Ft ¼ F0 þ ft j ðs; naÞ SPNE of the game in t; (2) Ft ¼
F0 j ðns; aÞ SPNE of the game in t; and (3) Ft ¼ 0 j ðs; aÞ SPNE of the game in t.
Given this law of motion, it results that (s, na) is a stationary equilibrium of the
game if: (i) e [ (ha ? hb)/2 - (F0 ? ft) and ft [ (ha - hb - e)/2 when ha [ hb or
ha = hb; (2) if e [ (ha ? hb)/2 - (F0 ? ft) when ha \ hb. Conversely, if
e \ (ha ? hb)/2 - (F0 ? ft) ðns; aÞ is a stationary equilibrium of the game. The
intuition behind these results is that when parametric conditions for cooperation do
not exist (exist), the initial stock of relational goods falls to zero (grows period by
period in proportion of the flow ft), and therefore, cooperative (noncooperative)
equilibria of the one-shot game persist across time.
3 Basic trust game when the players do not own the company
This section examines how equilibria change when we remove the assumption that
the two players own the company. We show that under reasonable assumptions,
single winner tournaments or pay for performance schemes are not optimal in the
presence of workers taste for relational goods. This result holds without considering
the crowding-out effect on intrinsic motivations and, therefore, is purely based on
extrinsic motivation grounds. More specifically, we show that (1) a steeper pay for
performance scheme increases the probability of noncooperative equilibria in the
presence of relational goods; (2) the cooperative equilibrium can never be attained
with the introduction of a single winner tournament scheme, even in the absence of
relational goods.
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3.1 Pay for performance schemes
Let us consider a simple pay for performance structure that consists of a fixed
remuneration (wa for player A, and wb for player B) plus an additional share s 2
½0; 1 of the employee performance when the latter contributes to firm output. The
analysis of the uniperiodal game under the new framework leads us to formulate the
following proposition.
Proposition 6 Individual pay for performance schemes are neutral in corporate
trust games in which players do not own the firm, as they do not provide incentives
to widen the parametric space of the cooperative equilibrium. In presence of
relational goods they raise the opportunity cost of the trustee’s not abuse strategy
and may crowd out cooperation since a steeper pay for performance scheme may
induce the switch from a cooperative (productively optimal) to a non cooperative
(productively suboptimal) equilibrium.
Proof Under the pay for performance scheme framework, the set of payoffs is
fwa þ sðha ha [ hb; 0j jha\hbÞ; wb þ sðhb ha\hb; 0j jha [ hbÞ;
ð1  sÞ½Maxðha; hb  ðwa þ wbÞg
under the (ns, a) pair of strategies, while it is
fwa; wb þ sðha þ hbÞ; ð1  sÞðha þ hbÞ  ðwa þ wbÞg
and
fwa þ sðha þ hb þ eÞ=2; wb þ sðha þ hb þ eÞ=2;
ð1  sÞðha þ hb þ eÞ  ðwa þ wbÞg
under the (s, a) and (s, na) strategy pairs, respectively (see Fig. 3 in the
‘‘Appendix’’).
Hence, in this case the not abuse condition (e [ ha ? hb) corresponds to the not
abuse condition of the full information game when players own the company. When
relational goods are considered, the payoff set under the (ns, a), (s, a) and (s, na)
strategy pairs becomes, respectively,
fF þ wa þ sðha ha [ hb; 0j jha\hbÞ; F þ wb þ sðhb hb [ ha; 0j jhb\haÞ;
ð1  sÞ½Maxðha; hbÞ  ðwa þ wbÞg
and
fF þ f þ wa þ sðha þ hb þ eÞ=2; F þ f þ wb þ sðha þ hb þ eÞ=2;
ð1  sÞðha þ hb þ eÞ  ðwa þ wbÞg
(see Fig. 4 in the ‘‘Appendix’’).
The not abuse condition in this case is e [ ha ? hb - 2(F ? f)/s. h
17
17 It is easy to check that the pay for performance incentive, which is compatible with nonnegative
profits, is s\1  ½2w=ðha þ hb þ eÞ under the (s, na) strategy; s\1  ð2w=hiÞ; where hi = Max[Max(-
ha, hb)], under the (ns,a) strategy and s \ 1 - [2w/(ha ? hb)] under the (s, a) strategy.
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This result shows that pay for performance schemes crowd out quality of
relationships and trust and provide a simple rationale to the puzzle evidenced,
among others, by Baker et al. (1998) on the relatively low use of individual pay for
performance schemes in personnel management. Our finding implies that a steeper
reward scheme (s) may induce the switch from the cooperative (s, na) to the
noncooperative solutions of the game. The intuition is that (s) becomes the relative
price of the relational goods in terms of missed output performance arising from the
abuse strategy.
Note that, given the model characteristics, if s = 0, F = f = 0 and the wage is
fixed at w, player B is indifferent between sharing and abusing. As a consequence,
proposition 6 implies that, if the pay for performance scheme is introduced, it
re-creates the same parametric space as in the base model in which players own the
firm and do not have a fixed wage, that is, a situation in which the decision to share
depends on the no-abuse condition (e [ ha ? hb). Note that this means that, even in
the absence of relational goods (F = f = 0), the introduction of pay for
performance schemes has nontrivial effects that may vary according to the
assumption crucial parameters: more specifically, if e [ ha ? hb, it shifts players
from indifference to cooperation, while if e \ ha ? hb, it moves them from
indifference to noncooperation. This implies that with a relationally poor
environment and high super-additivity (no-abuse condition met), a move from
fixed wage to pay for performance schemes may indeed generate positive
productivity effects. The same move generates negative effects if super-additivity
is low (no-abuse condition not met) or if s is high and more than compensates the
positive effect of relational goods.
3.2 Firms with a vertical hierarchical structure
Remuneration schemes in firms with hierarchical structure also depend on the job
positions, and changes in employees compensation may be obtained through a
promotion. As pointed out by Baker et al. (1998), promotions have two different
purposes: (1) they are a way to match individuals to the job for which they are best
suited, and (2) they provide incentives for lower level employees who evaluate the
opportunity to increase their wage and job position obtaining a better one.
Disadvantages and advantages of promotion-based incentive schemes are widely
debated. Baker et al. (1998) underline how incentives generated by promotion
opportunities depend on the probability of promotions and, in turn, on the identity
and expected horizon of the incumbent superior. Moreover, promotion incentives
(1) do not work after promotion of a young employee with a long expected horizon
in the job since such event decreases the probability of promotion and the incentive
to work hard for coworkers, (2) are reduced for employees who already obtained it
and (3) generate problems in slowly growing or shrinking firms.
This section examines a tournament promotion system in which the best
performer is promoted to a higher career level. At the beginning of the game, both
player A and player B work at the same hierarchical level. We assume that if the
(s,na) equilibrium applies, the winner is randomly selected and both players have a
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50% chance of getting the promotion. The introduction of this reward system leads
us to formulate the following proposition.
Proposition 7 With an individual winner tournament structure the not abuse
condition never applies.
Proof If the trustor (player A) decides in favor of sharing his information,
the payoff set is fwa þ ðPR ha [ hb; 0j jha\hbÞ; wb þ ðPR ha\hb; 0j jha [ hbÞ;
Maxðha; hbÞ  ðwa þ wb þ PRÞg where PR is the promotion wage premium. In this
framework, the strategies (s, a) and (s, na) are the following: in the first case, the
payoff set is
fwa; wb þ PR; ha þ hb  ðwa þ wb þ PRÞg
while in the second case, the payoff set is
fwa þ PR=2; wb þ PR=2; ha þ hb þ e  ðwa þ wb þ PRÞg:
Hence, the not abuse condition is wb ? PR/2 [ wb ? PR and can never hold. h
The consequence of this result is that the trustor never shares his information
when ha [ hb, while he is indifferent between doing it or not when ha \ hb;
however, in this case, B will abuse. Hence, we can conclude that, with a promotion-
based incentive system and an uniperiodal game, the cooperative solution can never
be reached. Consider that the presence of relational goods may mitigate this result.
In this case, the trustee’s taste for relational goods creates some room for the
cooperative solution and may offset his propensity to abuse. If the trustor decides in
favor of not sharing the payoff set will be (respectively for the trustor, the trustee
and for the firm):
fðF þ wa þ PR ha [ hb; 0j jhb [ haÞ; ðF þ wb þ PR hb [ ha; 0j jha [ hbÞ;
Maxðha; hbÞ  ðwa þ wb þ PRÞg:
If the trustor decides to share the idea, the payoff set is
fwa; wb þ PR; ha þ hb  ðwa þ wb þ PRÞg
or
fwa þ PR=2 þ F þ f ; wb þ PR=2 þ F þ f ; ha þ hb þ e  ðwa þ wb þ PRÞg
under the (s, a) and (s, na) pairs of strategies, respectively. Hence, the not abuse
condition is F ? f [ PR/2 and may, therefore, be respected in the presence of
strong player tastes for relational goods.
4 Optimal human resource policies in the trust game corporation
In the light of the results presented above, this section identifies the optimal policy
for a ‘‘’trust game corporation’’ that aims at maximising its output. When players do
not own the firm, and under reasonable parametric conditions, the preferred option
for the firm consists in investing in relational goods. Let us consider a single period
16 L. Becchetti et al.
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full information game with relational goods and assume the following parametric
conditions (ha [ hb, f = F = 0 and e \ ha ? hb) under which the SPNE of
the game is the (ns, a) equilibrium and the firm output loss gap is ha ? hb ? e
- Max(ha, hb). In such framework (under the conditions stated in proposition
4 [(ha ? hb - e)/2 [ F and f [ (ha - hb - e)/2], the firm will find optimal to
invest in relational goods if there exists a production technology of relational goods
yielding the following cost function Cðf  þ eÞ ¼ c such that c* \ ha ? hb ? e
- Max(ha, hb), with f* = Max[(ha ? hb - e)/2 - F, (ha - hb - e)/2] being the
threshold that induces the switch from the noncooperative to the cooperative (s, na)
equilibrium in the game illustrated in Sect. 2.2
5 Conclusions
In this paper, we model firm activity as a sequence of complex tasks having the
basic features of trust games and requiring the contribution of different workers with
nonoverlapping competencies. We shed light on two puzzles that standard firm
theories cannot explain, the lower than expected use of individual pay for
performance schemes and single winner tournament schemes, and the existence of
corporate expenditures aimed at strengthening relational links among coworkers.
The corporate trust game model presented provides several insights. First, it
identifies a microeconomic nexus between relational goods and productivity at firm
level. Second, it explains why individual pay for performance schemes may, under
reasonable parametric assumptions, crowd out relational goods and cooperation
justifying their lower than expected application in the reality. Third, it provides an
explanation on why single winner tournament schemes are rarely implemented by
corporations by showing how they crowd out information sharing and lead to
suboptimal output, even without taking into account their potential effect on
workers’ intrinsic motivations. Fourth, it shows how the taste for relational goods
significantly affects workers cooperation which, in turn, positively affects firm
productivity. As expected, our results are much stronger in single period than in
repeated games but, also in the latter, our conclusions hold for relevant parametric
spaces. Moreover, in those cases in which cooperative equilibria may be attained on
the basis of the Folk theorem, we show that such equilibria are not renegotiation
proof.
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Appendix
See Figs. 1, 2, 3 and 4.
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DO NOT SHARE SHARE 
ABUSE DO NOT ABUSE 
Fig. 1 The uniperiodal full information game
Player A 
Player B 
F |  ha < hb,F + ha |  ha > hb





[(ha + hb + e)/2] + F + f 
[(ha + hb + e)/2] + F + f
ha   + hb + e
DO NOT SHARE SHARE 
ABUSE DO NOT ABUSE 
Fig. 2 The uniperiodal full information game with relational goods
Player A 
Player B 
wa + s[ha| ha > hb,0| ha < hb]
wb + s[hb| hb > ha,0| hb < ha]
(1-s)[Max (ha,hb)] - (wa + wb)
wa
wb + s(ha + hb)
(1-s) [ha +hb] - (wa + wb)
wa + s(ha + hb + e)/2 
wb + s(ha + hb + e)/2 
(1-s)(ha + hb + e) - (wa + wb)
DO NOT SHARE SHARE 
ABUSE DO NOT ABUSE 
Fig. 3 The uniperiodal full information game with pay for performance schemes
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